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Management Control Systems and Strategy Change in Buyouts 
Abstract 
The impact of management buy-outs (MBO) on strategy and management control systems 
(MCS) is little understood. Previous research by Jones (1992) focused on efficiency-
enhancing buy-outs that were a feature of the early development of the market. However, 
MBOs are heterogeneous and more recent developments have involved ownership changes 
that stimulate entrepreneurial practices. The novel contribution of this paper is to use 
Simons' (1995) classification of beliefs systems, boundary systems, diagnostic and 
interactive control systems to extend Jones’ study to these newer forms of MBO. Within-
case analysis and cross-case comparisons from four buyout firms are used to capture the 
interaction between management control systems and competitive strategy formulation, 
implementation and modification. This evidence supports arguments that buy-out managers 
undertake efforts in balancing the traditional feedback systems with the newer systems that 
stimulate opportunity seeking and learning. 
 
Keywords: Management Control Systems, Strategy Change, Management Buyouts 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The rapidly growing literature on Management control systems (MCS) has tended to 
focus on isolated elements in organizations such as organizational design, allocation of 
responsibility and accountability, planning and budgeting, reward and incentive structures, 
information systems and performance evaluation practices (Speklé, 2001). Recognition that 
MCS can serve as a dialogue, learning and idea creation machine (Burchell et al., 1980) 
was followed by Simons’ (1995) model of the dynamic relationships between MCS and 
strategic change (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Simons’ study is an attempt to offer a coherent 
and comprehensive body of management control theory to which executives can turn for 
controlling strategy and guidance in performing their management control functions. His 
framework contains four levers of control that represent important variables from literature 
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with clear linkage to achieve strategy, e.g. beliefs systems, boundaries systems, the 
traditional diagnostic control systems and interactive control systems.  
In this article we use Simons' framework to extend Jones’ (1992) study of 
management control in buy-outs. Jones (1992) shows that operational controls were altered 
least, but that the format and procedure for the preparation of budgets became more 
appropriate, indicating the use of techniques in a more relevant manner than pre-MBO. 
Owner-managers initiated improvements in the quality of information, intensified formal 
controls and introduced more disaggregated feedback to increase operational efficiency and 
fulfilling profit standards. Existing management accounting techniques (MAT) provided 
channels to enable CEOs to communicate managerial philosophies concerning the internal 
functioning of the independent organisation. The managerial philosophy was reflected in an 
increase in importance of participation in the setting of budgets after the MBO. However, 
Jones' findings are based on interviews with senior managers from 17 buyouts covering the 
period 1984 to 1985. This first period of MBOs is strongly dominated by restructuring buy-
outs that take actions to protect the firm against the downside risks. New ownership and 
control mechanisms served as a medicine to foster efficiency. In contrast to Jones we 
selected venture capital backed buyouts from 1992 and 1994 that frequently take 
revitalization and entrepreneurial measures to exploit the upside potential of the firm 
(Wright et al., 2000). By selecting buy-out firms with growth perspectives and different 
organizational contexts than the Jones' study, we expect to find different effects concerning 
why and how managers change their perceptions of the role and importance of 
management control systems in a period of strategic (ownership) change. Otley (1999, 
p.365) also stresses the importance of studying management control in situations like 
MBOs where delayering takes place and where managers become responsible for strategy, 
management control and operational control as well. This article addresses the interaction 
between management control systems and competitive strategy formulation, 
implementation and modification (Atkinson et al., 1997, p.95). It examines the questions: 
what changes in the content and process of the firm's strategy take place after the buy-out 
and why and how the directors of the firm change their management control systems to 
implement these strategies? 
The structure is as follows: after defining an MBO and presenting briefly the study of 
Jones on buyouts and accounting control systems (ACS), we describe the framework of 
levers of control. Then we link the MBO to the framework in order to highlight the role of 
buy-out management along four levers of control in relation with strategy. The research 
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methodology used and data gathered are explained in the following section. From four case 
studies the role of the buy-out managers pre- and post-MBO are analyzed with regard to 
their potential to contribute to each of the four control levers. In a comparative analysis of 
case studies the differences in the way buy-out managers undertake management control 
activities are explained. The last section draws the major conclusions regarding the 
contribution of this article and makes comparisons with Jones’ (1992) study. 
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS 
An MBO involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring a 
significant equity stake as individuals with institutional support in order to control the 
company (Robbie and Wright, 1996). The structuring of a buy-out involves the 
introduction of significant equity incentives for the entrepreneurs involved, together with 
substantial external funding and active monitoring by investors (Jensen, 1993; Wright et 
al., 1994) in order to control agency costs. The emphasis in buy-outs in the US has 
typically focused on the debt providers who provide substantial amounts of leverage. 
However, in Europe venture capital firms play a major role in funding buy-outs. In the UK, 
for example, the vast majority of buy-outs with a transaction value above £5 million 
involve venture capital finance (CMBOR, 2001). In the Netherlands, the value of private 
equity backed buy-outs amounted to € 4,339 mn in 2001 (CMBOR, 2002) (Table 1). 
-insert Table 1 about here- 
MBOs backed by venture capital lead to significant changes in a firm’s ownership 
composition, and can contribute to subsequent growth and changes in strategy, 
organisational structure and entrepreneurial practices (Reid, 1996; EVCA, 2001). Venture 
capital backed buy-outs may especially involve cases that are more than the organisational 
efficiency tools traditionally discussed in the MBO literature. Wright et al. (2000) label 
these buy-outs revitalisation buy-outs if they complement their efficiency focus with 
incremental innovations and entrepreneurial buy-outs if they combine this with strategic 
innovations that emerge. Extensive screening by venture capitalists at the time of 
investment appraisal places considerable emphasis on the entrepreneurial skills of the 
managers leading a proposed buy-out or buy-in (Robbie and Wright, 1995; Bruining and 
Wright, 2002). VCs that have a reputation to provide capital for growth, use long-term 
incentives to encourage process or incremental innovation by managers and show good 
understanding of the industry and business in the post-investment period, will attract most 
of these deals. These aspects of MBOs and VCs behaviour emphasise the potentially 
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important interactions between MCS and strategy formulation, implementation and 
modification post buy-out. 
JONES’ STUDY 
Jones (1992) focuses on changes in planning and budget techniques and operational 
performance controls and why and how ongoing managers change their perceptions of the 
role and importance of these techniques. 17 senior managers were interviewed, partly chief 
executives or senior financial executives and both fully conversant with ways in which 
ACS were used before and after the buy-out. The interviews took place two years after the 
incumbent management bought the firms from their parent companies and relate to the 
period 1984-1985. The results show positive attitudes of the employees and managers to 
planning and budgeting and an increase of perceived importance of these techniques, 
indicating a change in the way the established MAT were applied. The owner-managers 
improved the quality of information, intensified formal controls and introduced more 
disaggregated feedback to increase operational efficiency and fulfilling profit standards. 
Finally the study reported that CEOs used existing MATs to communicate their managerial 
philosophies concerning the internal functioning of the firm. The managerial philosophy 
was reflected in an increase in importance of participation in the setting of budgets after the 
MBO. Jones concluded that the independence gained by the MBO firm improved the 
matching between ACS and contextual variables. These findings signal pressures to 
improve efficiency after MBO and an increased reliance upon ACS. Existing ACS after the 
MBO, are seen as channels for effecting change in organizational culture. The next section 
describes Simons’ framework to extend the Jones’ study. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FOUR LEVERS OF CONTROL 
We agree with Atkinson et al. (1997) that management control systems must provide 
the stability necessary to meet users’ needs efficiently, while simultaneously creating an 
information environment that permits managers to envision, and respond to new directions 
for the firm. We expect that the control needs of manager-owners in revitalization and 
entrepreneurial MBOs requiring product development or innovation go beyond the 
assistance of the ACS to achieve the financial targets agreed upon between management 
and investors. Careful analysis and understanding of critical performance variables is 
important to keep things on track, but to implement changes in strategy after an MBO 
effectively top management needs more than what the classical ACS provides. For 
example, enabling participants to interact with each other to keep the organization purpose 
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clear and to convince them of the right direction, giving them ample opportunities to 
influence that direction. To focus on the involvement of the buy-out management in 
performance measurement and control to promote upside potential of the MBO firm and to 
protect it against downside risk, the four levers of control in the framework of Simons 
(1995) are used. 
Control Levers 
At the core of the analysis of the four levers of control is the firm’s strategy (see 
Figure 1). This represents how the firm competes and positions itself vis-à-vis its 
competitors in the market. Simons argues that successful implementation of the firm's 
strategy depends on an understanding of certain constructs (Simons, 1995, p.6) which put 
into perspective that organizations are created for a purpose and that interaction among 
participants is needed to keep the organization’s purpose clear and in harmony with the 
environment. A different system, or lever, the use of which has different implications, 
controls each construct. Each lever offers some guidance to the strategy process. These 
levers are:  
1. Beliefs systems, used to inspire and direct the search for new opportunities; provide 
basic values, purpose and direction for the organization; 
2. Boundary systems, used to set limits on opportunity-seeking behavior; 
3. Diagnostic control systems, used to motivate, monitor, and reward achievement of 
specified goals;  
4. Interactive control systems, used to stimulate organizational learning and the 
emergence of new ideas and strategies; 
 
-insert Figure 1 about here- 
The first lever reinforces seeking opportunities and the second lever selects acceptable 
ones in order to delineate an acceptable domain. Both control systems frame the strategic 
domain. Westley (1990) found evidence that middle managers will not become enthusiastic 
participants in the search for opportunity if they do not understand the beliefs of the 
organization and are not invited to participate in transforming those beliefs into actions and 
strategies. Simons (1995, p.38) concludes that beliefs are tools for articulating and 
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communicating missions, credos and goals of the organization, that assist managers to 
transform these vague beliefs into focused activity. With respect to the second lever, the 
author makes a distinction between business conduct boundaries and strategic boundaries. 
The former imposes codes of business conduct based on society's laws, the firm's belief 
systems and codes of behavior promulgated by industry and professional associations. 
Strategic boundaries, focus on opportunity-seeking behavior to support explicit 
organizational strategies. Senior managers specify the range of business opportunities 
where they do not want to expend resources. They establish limits, based on defined 
business risks or desired returns before entering a market or start a business. 
The last two levers aim to control the implementation and formulation of the business 
strategy.  
The third lever introduces feedback systems to pay attention to critical performance 
variables in order to implement pre-set goals by taking corrective measures. Several studies 
label this type of ex-post monitoring, "output control" (Ouchi, 1977), "performance 
control" (Mintzberg, 1979), or results control (Merchant, 1985). Feedback of variance 
information allows adjustment of inputs or fine-tuning of the process so that future outputs 
will more closely match preset standards. Profit plans and budgets are the most pervasive 
diagnostic control systems in modern business firms.  
The fourth lever focuses on interaction between participants about strategic 
uncertainties caused by fundamental changes in technology, competition, consumer 
preferences, in order to make the firm responsive, thus realizing strategy adaptations in 
time. Interactive control systems stimulate search and learning and allow new strategies to 
emerge as participants throughout the organization respond to perceived opportunities and 
threats. Competitive markets require organizations to break out of limited search routines 
(Cyert and March, 1963). To activate interactive control systems, senior management must 
encourage continuous search activity and create information networks inside the 
organization to scan and report critical changes. As Burt (1992) notes, second-hand 
information is often fuzzy or inaccurate, but it serves to signal something to be looked into 
more carefully. Interactive control systems build internal pressure to break out of narrow 
routines, stimulate opportunity seeking and encourage the emergence of new strategic 
initiatives. The common denominator for all interactive control systems according to 
Simons (1995, p.123) is continuous re-estimation of future states and consideration of how 
to react best. In general the levers of control represent important variables with a clear 
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linkage to achieving strategy in routine and non-routine situations. 
Figure 1 unites two opposing forces in organizations: one is aimed at expanding 
opportunity seeking and learning and the other at focusing on search and attention. 
Volberda (1998, p.103) labels these forces as exploration and exploitation and this 
phenomenon as the flexibility paradox for organizations. On the one hand, he argues that 
organizations are challenged to develop dynamic or flexible responses capabilities based on 
knowledge of managers and other participants who recognize quickly the need to change, 
experimentation and learning (Teece et al., 1997). These dynamic capabilities require 
dynamic control that views the capacity to change as an essential feature of sustained 
success. On the other hand organizations handle certain competitive changes using 
specialized routines for standard behavior in routine situations. According to Volberda 
(1998, p.109) standards provide a memory for handling routine situations and in contrast to 
dynamic capabilities, eliminate the need for further communication and coordination 
among units and positions. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that the dynamic capabilities 
require a high absorptive capacity of management. It is critical to successful absorb signals 
beyond the periphery of the firm and recognise the value of new information, assimilating 
and applying it to commercial ends. This requires broadly scanning for new information 
and identifying and effectively using employees who serve as gatekeepers and boundary 
spanners. Both dynamic capabilities and specialized routines are recognized in the 
framework of Figure 1. The firm needs managers that combine the capabilities of 
stimulating creativity and innovation of its employees (dynamic capabilities that enhance 
dynamic control by using beliefs and interactive controls) with the minimisation of 
surprises and taking corrective actions (specialized routines that enhance static control 
using boundaries and diagnostic control).  
In buy-outs which need at least some innovation, opportunity search and learning 
seem to play an important role to control the (incremental) changes in strategy. In the next 
section we link Simons' concept of four levers to the MBO. How these link to MBOs is 
discussed in the next section. 
LINKING MBOs TO THE FRAMEWORK 
MBOs are not just about cost reduction, low growth prospects and few investment 
demands as traditionally analysed (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; Phan and Hill, 1995). 
Many have gone beyond efficiency incentives to become a vehicle for entrepreneurial 
initiatives and expansion of managerial discretion (Zahra, 1995; Bruining and Wright, 
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2002). Wright et al. (2000, 2001) signal a shift from cost reduction and strategic 
reorientation in mature sectors to creating value in technology sectors through product 
development and innovation. They argue that significant entrepreneurial progress is made 
not through managerial incentives alone but through a cognitive shift from a managerial to 
an entrepreneurial mindset. Hence, there is a need to look at more different strategies and 
management control consequences.  
In this section we develop the link between MBOs that take entrepreneurial measures 
and the framework of the four levers of control. We argue that this framework is useful to 
analyze the interrelation between the levers of control and strategy in the context of an 
MBO. We start with the firm's strategy and highlight the respective levers of control (see 
figure 1). 
It is well known that managers pre-MBO typically face investment restrictions from 
headquarters because their firms are peripheral to the product line of the parent company 
(Wright et al., 2001). These restrictions reduce the scope for responding entrepreneurially 
to market developments. Pre-MBO, buy-out firms, if they are peripheral to the core 
business of the parent, may not be allowed to have growth-oriented strategies and 
organisations. This conflict between subsidiary management and headquarters is often an 
indication that a buy-out may be appropriate (Bruining, 1992, Wright et al., 2001). A 
significant share of MBOs divested from parent companies change to more growth-
oriented strategies.  
Instead of obeying orders from headquarters that block innovation and investment in 
order to optimise goals of the diversified parent company, the buy-out managers have 
discretionary power to decide what is best for the business, how to organise and lead the 
company, and how the business plan can be carried out most profitably (Wright et al., 
2001). In his research of 47 MBOs, Zahra (1995) shows that substantially investment took 
place in research and development, the creation of new business and product development. 
Therefore we expect that interactive control systems will stimulate search and learning and 
allow new strategies to emerge as participants throughout the organization respond to 
perceived opportunities and threats. 
Distance between policy and implementation is also likely to become significantly 
shorter, because of the remarriage of ownership and control (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
New owner-managers may show higher levels of commitment to the implementation of a 
growth oriented strategy than before the MBO (Zahra, 1995; Wright, et al. 2001). In turn, 
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this is likely to change the organisational culture to one that is more entrepreneurially 
driven (Green, 1992). We expect that management will stimulate entrepreneurial initiatives 
that fit their vision and the firm’s mission. This will make beliefs a more explicit tool for 
managers to provide inspiration and organizational direction for focused, purposive activity 
by its employees. 
Top managers experience more immediate freedom and independence, which enables 
more flexible decision-making, more delegation, quicker action and easier consensus 
among manager/owners and shareholders (Bruining, 1992). This creates greater scope for 
autonomy. We expect delegation to produce the formulation of specific boundaries for 
employees post-MBO, such as return on investment, selection of product-markets and 
business conduct rules. This creates accountability by establishing rules and using 
sanctions. These boundaries will be communicated by the buy-out management to allow 
participants to achieve flexibility and creativity in domains with acceptable risks.  
Buy-outs typically involve increased levels of external funding. The costs of servicing 
debt and fixed dividend commitments act as a discipline to allocate resources to operations 
with the strongest cash flow and eliminate unprofitable operations (Jensen, 1993; Wright et 
al, 1994). In addition, buy-outs are actively monitored by investors in order to control 
agency costs. Jones (1992) reports increases in the quality of information used for 
operational control, an intensification of formal controls and a more positive attitude of 
employees towards ACS to facilitate participation following buy-out. Similarly, in VC 
investments generally, Mitchell, Reid and Terry (1997) show enhanced accounting 
information systems are introduced at the request of financial investors, particularly with 
respect to monitoring reports and budgetary components. Therefore we expect that 
diagnostic controls will play an important role after the buy-out to achieve the financial 
targets agreed upon between management and investors. Using diagnostic control systems 
as tools of strategy implementation requires a careful analysis and understanding of critical 
performance variables.  
By definition the incumbent management of an MBO takes a significant equity stake 
in order to control the company. The incentive compensation for the MBO managers is 
dependent on achieving targets for profits and turnover. Therefore, we expect an important 
role for diagnostic controls. Buy-outs provide not only equity incentives for managers but 
also control mechanisms that were previously lacking, to ensure the implementation of the 
ambitious growth targets of the new owners. 
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These arguments suggest that post-MBO business strategy needs to be controlled in a 
more dynamic way. The shift from maintaining the status quo pre-MBO to acting more 
efficiently and entrepreneurial post-MBO, requires more organisational flexibility than 
before the buy-out. Dependent on the new owners' conception of the environment and 
perspective of the organisation-environment relationship, the firm has to develop 
flexibility. For example, the capability for facilitating emergent, spontaneous strategies, 
terminating unprofitable existing activities and developing flexible resources for effective 
response to (un)anticipated changes (Volberda, 1998, p.43). This suggestion fits with the 
central idea of the framework in Fig.1.  
In order to address these control lever issues discussed above, the study examines the 
questions: what changes in the content and process of the firm's strategy take place after the 
buy-out and why and how does the management change their management control systems 
to implement these strategies? Answers to these questions are compared with the study of 
Jones. The next section explains the research methodology and data gathering process 
adopted in the study. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA GATHERING 
We use case studies to apply Simons’ approach to the interaction between strategy and 
management control in buy-out situations. The cases can be seen as specification case 
studies (Keating, 1995), to get a better view of the interaction between post buy-out 
strategies and management control. The empirical evidence is based on four detailed case 
studies. Face-to-face interviews with the CEOs, the CFOs and Directors of Production, all 
involved in the buy-out, were carried out during 1998 and 1999. The interviews contained 
semi-structured questions in retrospective about the content and the formulation of the 
strategy and the applied levers of control pre- and post-MBO (see Appendix 1).These 
questions were developed from the existing literature relating to buy-outs and control 
(Green, 1992; Jones, 1992; Simons, 1995 and Wright et al., 2000). The questions referred 
to two years before and two years after the MBO. The MBOs had 120-350 employees at 
the time of the buy-out and came from different vendor sources. They were selected to 
show different efforts to increase product innovation post-MBO. The first firm is a 
privatization buy-out of a governmental owned agency supplying paramedical advise, 
orthopedic and rehabilitation products to individuals with a physical functional limitation 
for lodging, working and living. The second firm is a managers-investor’s buy-out 
(MAINBO) of a division from a foreign parent company, which manufactures and sells 
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synthetic packaging for the consumer market in the food sector. The third firm is a 
management buy-out (MBO) from a local parent company, which went into receivership. 
The buy-out firm manufactures Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided 
Manufacturing (CAM) systems that creates one-stop solutions for the carpet industry, 
printed textiles and woven fabrics industries. Besides this activity the firm is also a 
producer of Geographic Information Systems for municipalities. All three are venture 
capital backed. The fourth case study represents a shareholder repurchase of a bus company 
by the founders (management buy-in). For a brief description of the buy-out firms see 
Appendix 2.  
Using the typology of Wright et al. (2000) Companies 1 and 3 can be identified as 
entrepreneurial buy-outs fostering strategic innovation and entrepreneurial cognition. 
Strategic innovation emerges because high-powered incentives and discretion are given to 
owner/managers. Company 1 is the first to business to sell their method for reintegrating 
handicapped persons to employers and their approach to recycling orthopedic and 
rehabilitation products. Company 3 shows its innovativeness by improving communication, 
networking and multi-media solutions in computer graphics technology and textile 
technology. Company 2 and 4 are revitalization buy-outs involved in process and 
incremental, imitation innovations, which complement an efficiency focus. Company 2 has 
built on the one stop- shop business concept for packaging in the food sector in addition to 
its efficiency focus. Company 4 has selected subsidized market segments and 
customization of the bus manufacturing process, e.g. fuel usage, choice of material, number 
of seats and wheel suspension in addition to its labor and material cost transparent bus 
manufacturing process. 
Coupled with within-case analysis cross-case comparisons were carried out. Using 
information from these four distinct cases highlights the role of the levers more 
transparently. Applying the framework in a variety of buy-outs, enables us to verify the 
relationships in the framework in a way that contributes to development of management 
control theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Choosing these buy-outs from the period 1992-1994 
allowed sufficient time for the operational, organizational and strategic consequences of the 
change in ownership to be implemented. Three of the four firms were venture capital 
backed, but all set targets to grow internally from entrepreneurial measures such as 
incremental innovation and externally from acquisitions and or alliances.  
The operationalisation of the variables in the control levers framework was based on 
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the measures used by Simons (1995). Other sources of information used included business 
plans, annual reports and press articles. In one of the cases a stock exchange prospectus 
was available. Interviews were conducted with all three managers to triangulate views 
about changes in strategy content and strategy formulation as well as in management 
control activities (Eisenhardt, 1989). Full write-ups of the company studies were sent for 
comments to the respondents. This approach was adopted as a more appropriate instrument 
for capturing the complexity of the strategy and management control changes taking place 
following the transfer of ownership (Greene, 1992) than would be possible by a survey. 
CASE STUDY RESULTS 
The respective sources of the buy-outs vary, but all share pre-MBO a common lack of 
investments for innovation and renewal purposes. The health care privatization of 
Company 1 transferred its activities from a task for government to a more commercial 
private sector focus. Companies 2 and 3 were not central strategically to their parents and 
were divested by a management and investors buy-out and a management buy-out, 
respectively. Company 4 is a management buy-in from receivership, indicating that the 
core activity is not viable and thus in need of drastic change to make it commercially 
viable. Using within and cross-case analysis, we report below the changes in strategy 
content and strategy process as well as the related changes in the control levers. In 
Appendix 3 we summarize the key findings for each buyout. 
Strategy 
The content of strategy following the buy-out in all case studies shows a sharp 
increase in market and/or product focus. Next to internal growth, all four firms use external 
vehicles for growth post-MBO, such as international acquisitions in Companies 1, 2 and 3 
or international alliances with customers or firms as in Companies 2 and 4.  
Company 1 shows a transformation from a monopolistic supplier of wheelchairs to a 
market-oriented competitor in the fast growing market for healthcare services and 
equipment. It acquired a number of similar operations throughout Holland and soon after 
the MBO it provided a full service package of equipment supply, consulting and advisory 
services to healthcare organizations, hospitals, nursing homes, corporations and 
individuals. This strategy required the development of new services such as the recycling 
of paramedical devices and car rental. 
Company 2 developed from high volume packaging production to high value added, 
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custom-made goods. After the buy-out, the firm preferred to concentrate on the 
development of its 'one stop-one shop solution' packaging concept by leveraging synergies 
between the business units (folding cartons, flexible packaging and plastic packaging) 
in the group through cross-selling services. Two years after the MBO it developed 
partnerships with large international food firms to increase its production innovation 
capacity, indicating a shift from mere efficiency to a value added innovative focus.  
Company 3 developed a strong competitive aggressiveness stance after the buy-out by 
offering low prices, as well as a customized focus (niche) in the carpet industry. It acquired 
firms in several European countries specialized in weaving techniques to develop further 
technology and increase market share. Post-MBO it launched CAD/CAM software to 
produce complex carpet design and software for use in other applications. Its other business 
unit is striving to become the market leader through partnerships that offer innovative 
solutions in geographic information systems for municipalities.  
Company 4, the bus manufacturer, shifted from a mass market approach to a 
'customized focus' in manufacturing and selling buses. It established alliances with 
Canadian and US bus companies to serve the US market. The new owners increased the 
firm's customized focus on the use of technology, materials and fuel usage for their new 
product development and were successful in obtaining orders for subsidized bus 
manufacturing for underdeveloped countries. 
Besides changes in the strategy content we observed changes in the process of strategy 
formulation. Post-MBO in Company 1 and 3 strategies were formulated by the 
management team and the Supervisory Board with representatives of the venture 
capitalists. Additional input for the strategy process in these companies comes from 
consumer councils and brainstorming sessions. In Company 2 this process takes place 
through customer oriented self-managing teams and in Company 4 through weekly 
meetings between the manager/owner and the six heads of departments. However, the 
strategy goals after the MBO remain the same in terms of target percentage increases in 
market share, divisional profit, competitiveness standards and market penetration. 
Beliefs systems 
Pre-MBO we found no beliefs systems in the sense of formal business philosophies 
relating to how to create value. Post-MBO these beliefs are formalized in a culture that 
stimulates intrapreneurship, supports customer focus and quality control orientation. In the 
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cases studies we found a variety of organizational arrangements through which this was 
stimulated. In Company 1, regional meetings between the CEO and the managers from the 
dealer network were used to discuss how to anticipate opportunities and in what direction. 
An analysis of strengths and weaknesses of every manager was made in order to determine 
their training needs and the firm’s replacement policy. During the regional ‘soapbox’ 
meetings the main core values that promote a business mind were: learning to work 
efficiently, stimulating a commercial attitude among salespersons and teaching physicians 
as fee earners to become more cost conscious in the post-MBO situation. In Company 2 the 
management was actively involved in communicating that product quality would be 
achieved by the way customers, suppliers and employees work together in continuous 
improvement projects. Self-managing teams consisting of technical and commercial people 
negotiated the contracts with customers. Company days, business trips and seminars were 
organized in Company 3 to stimulate the ‘we-feeling’ in an organization that is eager to 
learn from the ideas and experiences of its own people. The top manager stimulates the 
perception among his employees of a mutual adventure. Company 4, communicated its 
business values formally to its production managers, e.g. about flexible manufacturing and 
acceptable price-quality ratios using ISO-documents, to achieve competitive advantage. 
They use these documents during regularly planned team briefings of employees. All but 
the last firm used internal business magazines to support the communication of missions 
and credos and to inform people in the firm about current business developments. 
Boundary Systems 
The boundaries with regard to product markets and investment were much more 
clearly specified post-MBO. Before privatization, in Company 1 attention was not given to 
strengths or weaknesses of the firm, nor was any form of entrepreneurship promoted that 
involved risk-taking. After privatization a lot of time was invested in product innovation 
and in the exploration of the market, which resulted in the development of guidelines to 
approach a variety of customers. In this firm, the strategic domain developed after four to 
five years. This was demonstrated by divesting in 1998 aconsulting advisory service 
acquired in 1995 and at the same time starting activities like recycling of paramedical 
devices and car rental for the disabled.  
In the other firms, boundaries were mainly found in guidelines such as return on 
investment targets and limitation to pre-selected product-market combinations, which were 
absent pre-MBO. In Company 2 the new shareholders were only willing to accept 
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investments in the food sector, which comply with environmental rules which are expected 
to achieve ROI's above 20 percent. With 300 million consumers, Eastern Europe is an 
important target. Two loss-making companies were divested following the MBO because 
they lacked the potential to contribute profitably to specialist packaging services.  
In Company 3 an indicator of greater risk taking following the MBO was the venture 
set up in the US. This was a very expensive lesson because this venture failed. After the 
failure of the start-up, the chief financial officer was given more authority to calculate the 
risks of the firm's strategic decisions. From then on, opportunities to expand in familiar 
niches were selected in Europe. After the buy-out, Company 3 acquired several companies 
to expand into the carpet and the printed textile market in the UK, France, Belgium and in 
its home market. 
The size of the investment, the subsidy for manufacturing customised and 
environmental friendly buses and buses aimed at developing countries were the most 
important boundaries for Company 4. Initial costs were kept low because Company 4 
focuses on opportunities within these boundaries, thus avoiding major leaps into new 
market segments. 
Diagnostic Control Systems 
Before privatization, a framework for diagnostic control in Company 1 was missing. 
Instruments for planning, cost control and performance measurement developed gradually 
following privatization. Initially, as part of the development of an entrepreneurial culture, 
control occurred on a more informal basis. After a couple of years the subsidiaries became 
profit centres and measured the success of managers in the beginning only by turnover 
targets. In practice this led to a severe 10 percent loss of personnel caused by heavy 
pressure by the management to reach turnover goals. Management focussed on the sales of 
wheelchairs because of the higher margins compared to the wheelchairs for hire. This was 
at the expense of the wheelchair rentals thus decreasing the chances for employees to 
satisfy customer needs, and causing caused higher costs of supplies. The Company was 
forced to differentiate its diagnostic systems in relation to performance evaluation from a 
single focus on turnover to a more balanced set of criteria. Achievement of the targets set 
for these criteria determines the flexible component in the reward structure of the 
managers. This is based on different weights comprising profit margin for 30 percent, 
accounts receivable, cost targets and stock control targets for 20 percent, and last but not 
least turnover targets 10 percent.  
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Following the MBO in Company 2 the managing directors played more ‘hands-on’ 
roles than before, focusing on intensifying machine utilization and efficiency, lowering 
costs and increasing of capacity. After two years of restructuring, performance 
measurement based on critical success factors was extended to factors that support close 
working relationships between the firm and its industrial customers. This was implemented 
by appointing account management teams for several clients. For example, the firm uses 
electronic data interchange to integrate its planning system with the clients’ planning 
systems, enabling more accurate scheduling of production and deliveries. Just in time 
delivery systems and other logistic support help minimize clients’ inventories and ensure 
receipt of their packaging at short notice. As a result, 100 of the 140 employees participate 
after the MBO in the budget process in order to control costs, sales and profits.  
In Company 3 and Company 4 the content of diagnostic controls have not changed. In 
Company 4 the bus manufacturing process is controlled by clear budget norms of labor and 
material based on long standing experience and by quality checks. However, in Company 3 
the venture capitalist introduced a more refined way to report on cash flows at the product 
level.  
Another change reported in both companies is the changing attitudes toward the use of 
control systems. Employees now experience the budgets as their own budget and thus their 
own costs and are thus more eager to take budgets decisions more seriously than before the 
buyout. Budgets are tailored to their own information needs rather than being enforced top-
down by headquarters with unrealistic deadlines and targets. In general, top management is 
paying more attention to internal communication of information about turnover, 
prospective customers, orders and tenders.  
Interactive Control Systems 
Interactive control in Company 1 took place through the strategic appointment to the 
Supervisory Board of the chairman of the Dutch Council for the Disabled. Top 
management now receive up-to-date information from the political decision-making 
process on the deregulation of certain industries and on legislation with regard to 
individuals with a physical functional limitation. This enables management to detect and 
remove major strategic uncertainties for the firm. Another example is the establishment of 
a consumer council where on a regular basis the supply of products and services is 
discussed between the responsible managers and their customers. 
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For Company 2 a serious threat is over-capacity. Trends that have become stronger 
after the MBO are: increasing responsibility for environmental friendly products, 
increasing buyer concentration and bargaining power and rapid, short-to-medium run 
volumes of specialized packaging. These changes required effective strategic response by 
increasing operating scale on an international basis, by being more receptive to requests for 
customization and by recognising the need to take account of environmental factors. The 
one-stop shop and supply chain concepts are triggers for the Company's proactive and 
innovative approaches to packaging. These help management prevent the risks of 
oversupply involved in this type of industry. In addition, they involve decentralized self-
managing teams with seats on consumer panels who have the authority to make decisions 
concerning production, costs and prices. Quality management training programs are used to 
ensure that skills keep the same pace with technological and market developments. The 
firm is thus able to respond rapidly to latest consumer trends. These partnerships with large 
customers are used to establish a position of sustained growth and present a continual 
demand for additional capital investment. From certain levels approval by the board of 
commissioners is mandatory.  
In Company 3 we found an explicit link between interactive and diagnostic control 
systems. The results from the brainstorming sessions in business units between 
management and personnel were used in budgets, thus highlighting the consequences for 
strategy and implementation. Before the MBO only the management team had discussions 
about the strategy and communicated the budgets top down to the departments. Post-MBO 
the directors supplied the employees with a list of priorities regarding the detection, 
analysis and exploration of business opportunities as well as the development of policy, 
e.g. selection of takeover targets and investment in technological applications for weaving 
and geographic information systems. There was more room for bottom-up communication 
and quick decision-making, resulting in a richer stream of business proposals with regard to 
acquisitions and equipment from the business units, thus stimulating autonomy regarding 
entrepreneurial initiatives. 
In Company 4 interactive control takes place between top and middle management in 
weekly meetings to discuss issues such as the consequences of competitor actions, market 
trends and changes in subsidizing business for developing countries for the firm's strategy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to analyze why and how management control systems are used 
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in buy-outs to implement strategy change. The principal findings are as follows:  
The Companies in this study show an increase in the market orientation of their 
strategies post-MBO. The new owners/managers are adapting their firms strategically 
through innovation, marketing and organization design to different market niches and 
contexts. These findings supplement the study of Jones (1992) where for the majority of 
companies the state of environmental dynamism was unaltered, thus enabling the 
companies to intensify the use of their existing accounting techniques of formal control 
such as budgets. In contrast, in the buy-outs examined here, there was a need to adopt new 
ways of coping with changes in strategy direction. The evidence from the four case studies 
supports the view of Wright et al. (2000), that managerial incentives in buy-out firms can 
foster imitation or strategic innovation after a period of neglect. The new owners are 
released from the investment constraints of the former parent company that blocked 
innovation and can carry out their own ideas on how to make profits.  
In the Jones' study regular but less formal discussion of operational and policy matters 
took place only at the management level. No novel organisational control system emerged 
to provide additional information concerning the interface between external environments 
and internal operations. In our study, changes in the strategy formulating process were 
characterized by interactive controls. However, the frequency with which strategic 
information about competitors, products, politics and technology was analysed by 
management varied. Some firms use brainstorm sessions, others task teams and/or councils. 
Interactive control is typically used selectively to sustain revitalization and innovation 
strategies. These organizational arrangements are indicative of search and learning 
behaviour. Key personnel at different levels of these companies are involved in discussions 
with top management about strategic uncertainties relating to the intended strategy.  
These finding are consistent with the characteristic that buy-outs bring management 
and ownership closer to each other and narrow the gap between strategy and 
implementation (Bruining, 1992). Before the buy-out there was a lack of regular exchange 
of strategically important information between subsidiary management and employees. 
This exchange, if present, was limited to the management of the parent company and the 
management of the subsidiary. This pattern changed after the MBO as the former 
subsidiary management has to delegate tasks and control to lower levels in the firm and be 
very clear about the future direction of the firm.  
Management control goes beyond the management accounting systems in buy-outs 
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where entrepreneurial opportunities exist. In addition to the existing formal controls, these 
companies use other management control techniques to match the changing environmental 
conditions. With the framework of the 'levers of control', practices are identified that reflect 
the choice of which management control activities are selected in cases where the 
companies want to add value to the business through new products/new market 
developments that were frustrated by the parent prior to the MBO.  
One of the new controls is the increase in use of beliefs. The business philosophy 
regarding how to reach customers is formally communicated by management to employees 
in a variety of forms in all the companies. Affirmation is explicitly sought about the 
direction of the firm, its ambition and the essential capabilities and attitudes of its 
employees that stimulate entrepreneurship. Pre-MBO the respective parent companies did 
not develop initiatives to use these beliefs systems explicitly.  
The Jones study focused on existing ACS as a channel for effecting changes in 
organizational culture, e.g. managerial philosophies to promote participation in budgets. 
Participation was not extended beyond middle managers, which contrasts with the 
apparently more entrepreneurial oriented leadership style used by top managers in our case 
studies. We see the reported increase in use of beliefs in our study as a move towards 
improved matching of an entrepreneurial culture with the organizational context, where 
financial risks increase after becoming an independent company.  
This finding is consistent with the buy-out literature (Green, 1992; Zahra, 1995; 
Wright et al., 2000; Bruining and Wright, 2002) that highlights new owner-managers with 
high levels of commitment eager to implement growth oriented strategies to use the upside 
potential of the firm. These organizations are characterized by an entrepreneurial driven 
culture that encourages initiatives by its employees to detect profitable opportunities. 
If boundaries are lacking (as in Company 1) before the buy-out, top management 
gradually set standards for investment volumes, return ratios and for well-defined markets. 
From the beginning in all but Company 1, the selection of market niches and minimum 
return on investments are the most cited boundaries. Within the new boundaries the 
employees and managers are free to generate proposals. This is in sharp contrast with the 
Jones' study, where no messages concerning the prevalent markets for the firm and 
conducts for human behavior were transmitted through the established ACS. This is 
probably due to the lesser need to exchange information about strategy and how to achieve 
it.  
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The finding of renewed boundaries is consistent with the delegation of decision-
making to lower levels in the organization. Decrease in size and complexity of the 
organizational structure stimulate decentralization after buyout (Phan and Hill, 1995) and 
top managers experience more immediate freedom and independence, which enables more 
flexible decision-making and delegation. 
Before the MBO the employees of the companies experience diagnostic control 
systems as distant, not realistic, not tailor made to own information needs and top-down 
enforced. This changes post-MBO. Freedom from conformity with the practices of the 
former parent resulted in management control activities being more closely matched with 
organizational contexts. Some companies, at the request of the venture capitalist, take fine-
tuning measures to supplement the monitoring on cash flows and contribution to profit on a 
product basis. Managers and employees attach more importance to traditional accounting 
measures. The involvement of employees in the materialization of budgets increases, as 
well as their experience to perceive budgets as an important navigation tool. The planning 
takes place more accurately. Employees and managers develop information systems that 
are more appropriate to their needs. A major difference with regard to the budgeting 
processes is the shift from top-down to bottom-up budgeting.  
This finding is supported by Jones (1992) on buy-outs and also by Mitchell et al. 
(1997) for venture capital investments generally. Jones found that planning systems 
became more meaningful, were connected to real strategy and were part of the routines. 
Changes in attitudes towards management control were associated with and facilitated by 
managerial philosophies, which extended informal control, through participation, as well as 
formal control through documentation and meetings. Removing barriers between 
management and workers is seen as necessary to prepare budgets with more commitment 
and reality. The diagnostic control levers such as budget systems remain the same after the 
buy-out, because parent companies have subsidiaries with well-developed information 
systems. Operational controls were altered least.  
Overall we conclude that this study revealed coherence between a change in strategy 
and the application of levers of control. Explicitness of strategy content and strategy 
formulation appears to be positively related to the intensity with which the levers are used 
separately and together for implementation. Before buy-out, companies tend to be less 
entrepreneurial, because the parent companies do not consider them as core business and 
exclude them from financial resources. Managers and employees in the pre-buy-out 
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situation are not very well informed about the future direction of the company as a 
subsidiary, and this makes them more reluctant to search for new opportunities. Our case 
studies indicate that growth buy-outs enhance the positive stance taken to entrepreneurship 
by their new owners/managers. They initiate more entrepreneurial activities, which in turn 
make the management and employees eager to search and focus on certain opportunities as 
well as to learning. The coherence of management control and management accounting 
systems, lacking pre-buy-out developed incrementally post buy-out. We see the use of 
hitherto neglected or ignored control mechanisms as an additional capacity to strategy 
implementation and formulation and as a valuable extension of the diagnostic control 
systems post-MBO.  
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Appendix 1: Interview about strategy and control levers pre- and post-MBO in 
retrospective 
 
General 
-background of the interviewee 
-role of the interviewee held within the firm 
-changes in the role post-MBO? 
-history of the firm 
-general information about core products and organization 
-general information about industry, market- and technology development 
-external shareholders/financiers  
 
Strategy 
-reason for the MBO 
-underlying strategic goals  
-vision on management  
-strategy content  
-strategy process  
-effectiveness strategy  
-adaptations strategy  
 
beliefs systems 
-presence of shared vision  
-use of missions, vision, credos 
-does it affect the your role in any way 
-involvement employees/management  
-is there a cultural change program? 
-relationship shared vision and new opportunities 
 
boundary systems 
-boundaries for the firm in seeking chances and opportunities 
-the risks avoided? 
-operating rules/behavioural codes managers 
-sanctions for opportunity seeking behavior 
 
diagnostic control systems 
-firm’s key performance indicators 
-critical success factors; responsibilities 
-involvement with translation strategy in budgets 
-are any changes made? Reasons? 
-standards, output measures, incentives budgets 
-role of monitoring performance  
-fine-tuning budgets post mbo 
-monitoring role of external shareholders  
-frequency of budget adaptations  
-attention and attitudes employees towards budget 
-information needs and current performance measures  
 
interactive control systems 
-nature involvement employees non-routine decisions 
-experiments, knowledge systems, management development, learning 
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-items from operations on strategic agenda top management 
-frequency attention to budgets from all managementlevels 
-frequency of discussion strategic items between management levels 
-changes in assumptions of firm's strategy 
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Appendix 2: Company synopses 
 
Company 1 
The firm is a supplier of paramedical advice, orthopedic and rehabilitation products to 
individuals with a physical functional limitation for lodging, working and living. Till 1994 
it functioned as a public municipal medical service as part of the law on municipal 
administrative office. After 1994 this public service agency with 240 employees was 
privatized and took care for service contracts for disabled persons with local authorities on 
a decentralized level in competition with other companies. After privatization it introduced 
a wheelchair renting system that lowered the costs with 20 percent and led to 25 percent 
savings on the budgets for the municipalities. Next to being price competitive the firm kept 
on improving service levels and developing new orthopedic products for the customer in 
order to grow autonomously. The firm created an own dealers network, and acquired a care 
products firm, with dfl 60 mn and 240 employees. In 1997 turnover amounted fl 290 mn 
with 1000 fte's. New shareholders were the management (4.5%), Alpinvest and Parcom 
(each 40%) and Residentie Venture Beheer (15%). A foundation has a small percentage of 
shares under trust for the employees of the firm. 
 
Company 2 
In 1994 the firm was sold by a state owned Austrian Company in a management buy-out to 
its directors. Price dumping forced the parent Company to divest its subsidiary. A division 
of the buy-out firm with 140 employees, manufactures synthetic packaging for the 
consumer market in the food sector and has three business units. One for diary products, 
another develops and produces packaging concepts for convenience goods and the third is 
specialized in wholesale and large-scale business. These business units are responsible for 
product development, planning and production as well as for marketing, sales and supply. 
CVC Capital and Parcom Ventures has each a 40% stake in the equity, whereas the rest of 
the shares are in the hands of top management and 15 middle managers. After the first 
years of improving efficiency and using synergies between the business units to create a 
one-stop shop, the firm developed into a specialist in packaging solutions on the basis of 
long-term partnership with consumer brand multinationals. It specializes to provide a wide 
range of specialist packaging services and packaging concepts that demand high speed, 
capacity imagination and innovation. Innovation in the plastics division is e.g. a high 
barrier packaging which keeps fruit fresh and allows customers to see the product. The 
folding cartons division developed for its client an easy opening facility 
 
Company 3 
The firm is a manufacturer of Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided 
Manufacturing (CAM) systems and creates one-stop solutions for the carpet industry, 
printed textiles and woven fabrics industries. After the buy-out it started gradually to invest 
in developing, manufacturing and marketing dedicated software and services for textile 
design, colourmatching, color separation, fabric simulation, 3D presentation and 
production of textiles. It launched a new CAD/CAM software Tuft/NT to produce complex 
carpet designs and reduced production time from initial to final stage. Besides these 
systems it is also a producer of Geographic Information Systems for municipalities. With 
headquarters based in The Netherlands, offices in the UK, France and the US with a 
worldwide agent network, the firm positions itself to market and sell its products on a 
worldwide scale. Turnover amounts Dfl 13 mn of which 70% is exported. Gilde Investment 
owns a minority stake of 36%. Top management and 20 employees hold a majority stake of 
64%. The firm was bought for an undisclosed sum from receivership of HCS Technology, 
which went bankrupt in 1992.  
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Company 4 
In the late eighties this bus manufacturer merged with three competitors into one Company 
United Bus. This new combination did not last long because of the increased competition 
by new entrants on the bus replacement market and the privatization of regional transport 
in Europe that cancelled the subsidy arrangements for bus companies. In 1993 United Bus 
went into receivership and the former owners bought the firm back in a management buy-
in. The official receivers preferred the former family owners of the firm above industrial 
buyers because they are better informed about the industry and guaranteed employment of 
180 people. The new owners increased the firm's customized focus on the use of 
technology, materials and fuel usage for their new product development and were 
successful to get orders for subsidized busmanufacturing for underdeveloped countries. 
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Appendix 3: Summary of findings 
Case 1: privatization Case 2: mainbo Case 3: mbo Case 4: mbi 
Company 
Strategy 
-content 
 
-goal 
 
-process 
Products physical 
handicapped  
from monopolist to market 
oriented advice, products, 
distribution 
25% market share 
 
post buy-out governance 
with venture capitalist and 
management team 
Packaging 
from volume to 'one-
stop-shopping'/ tailor-
made solutions buyers 
every subsidiary 
competitive and 
profitable 
delayering firm, self 
managing customer-
oriented teams 
Software textile 
manufacturer 
from price to 
price/quality and 
acquisitions 
market leader niches, 
partnerships suppliers 
and shop solutions 
post buy-out 
governance with 
venture capitalist and 
and personnel 
 
Bus manufacturer 
price vs. 
differentiation 
markets 
increase market 
share, market- 
penetration 
manager/owner 
and six division 
managers 
Beliefs 
 
 
from passive to active 
solution seeking 
from no corporate 
entrepreneurship to intra-
preneuring  
From passive to active 
attention to quality 
and customer 
orientation through 
mission 
from meaningless to 
meaningful mission 
shared vision, 
Company days, 
enforcement 'we-
feeling'  
 
Communication 
mission by ISO-
documents to 
employees: identi- 
fication, 
acceptable price-
quality relation 
Boundaries 
 
 
 
from job descriptions to 
guidelines to approach a 
variety of customers by new 
product- development 
from no selection to 
delineating products 
and markets: only 
food sector which 
comply to 
environmental rules 
Minimum ROIs 
selection of two 
product-market-
combinations: carpet 
and printed textile 
market & geographic 
information systems 
for municipalities 
concentration on 
active utilization 
of subsidies for 
existing markets: 
underdeveloped 
countries & 
customized 
environmental 
friendly busses 
Diagnostic 
Controls 
 
 
post buy-out: responsibility 
accounting with appropriate 
accounting measures 
developing overtime 
from targets figures 
on division level, to 
contracts per team.  
budgets and personal 
setting of tasks; 
just in time delivery; 
format budgetsystems 
unchanged; VC's fine-
tuning of CFL; after 
buyout more 
importance attached 
to conscious 
consideration and 
feedback. 
format budget- 
systems unchan-
ged; after buyout 
more top-down-
bottom-up 
process; clearer 
responsibilities; 
quality checklists 
Interactive 
Controls 
 
interactive control mainly 
between top management 
and venture capitalists; 
creating learning 
organization through 
soapbox, recurrent 
consultation employees and 
customers. 
consultation about:  
-transfer new 
production with 
reference to new 
legislation;  
-synergy between 
subsidiaries. 
brainstorming in BU's 
about future direction, 
encouraging bottom 
up initiatives by the 
directors. 
pre-mbi no inter-
active control; 
post mbi weekly 
consultations 
about changes in 
competitive 
actions and 
impact of trends 
on the strategy 
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Figure 1:Interrelation levers of control with strategy, opportunity, and attention (Simons 1995, 
157 
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Table 1: Number and Total Value (€ mn) of Buy-outs in the Netherlands (1991-2001) 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
NR 44 50 55 41 57 56 61 69 42 75 54 
€ 594 446 579 1258 856 1030 1082 3457 4463 1785 4339 
 
Source: Centre for Management Buy-Out Research (CMBOR) 
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